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Abstract
We propose a novel approach for testing for rational speculative bubbles in segmented capital mar-
kets. The basic idea is that, under capital controls, heterogeneity of speculative expectations across
international equity markets causes financial assets with identical cash flow promises to trade at different
prices. Because these deviations from the law of one price inherit the properties of the speculative bubble
process, they display periods of explosive dynamics and have predictive power for future movements in
equity prices in sample. These two hypotheses can be examined empirically using sequential unit root
tests and predictive regressions. An attractive feature of this approach for bubble detection is that it does
not require the specification of a model for market fundamentals, thus mitigating the well-known joint
hypothesis problem. The focus of the paper is on mainland Chinese companies that cross list shares in
Hong Kong. China is an ideal setting for our analysis because of the significant restrictions on capi-
tal movements imposed by the authorities and the turbulent behaviour of its stock market over the last
decades.
Keywords: speculative bubbles; law of one price; AH premium; recursive unit root tests; predictive
regressions
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China’s stock market: A crazy casino (The Economist, May 26th 2015)
Since the re-opening of the Shanghai stock exchange (SSE) and the foundation of the Shenzhen stock ex-
change (SZSE) in the early 1990s, the Chinese stock market has experienced a remarkable growth. Starting
from just a handful of listed companies in 1990 and a tiny market capitalization, it expanded to over three
thousand firms in 2017 and a market capitalization of seven trillion dollars, ranking second worldwide be-
hind the United States (Carpenter and Whitelaw, 2017). While the Chinese stock market has grown rapidly
over the last decades, movements in Chinese share prices have been anything but tranquil, with spectacular
price rallies followed by severe market crashes occurring in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s. Such extreme
financial events appear difficult to explain using observed market fundamentals and have led to a consensus
that speculative forces are in action in the Chinese stock market. Notably, in his 2001 speech, the preeminent
Chinese economist Wu Jinglian compared China’s stock market to a casino, that is manipulated by specula-
tors and lacks a strong link to fundamentals. The casino term has since been adopted by the popular press
to describe the overall behaviour of Chinese share prices. Given China’s leading role in global economic
growth and investment, the presence of speculative dynamics, bubbles, in the country’s capital allocation
system constitutes a topic of increasing significance.
In general, testing for speculative bubbles in financial markets is confounded by the fact that the fun-
damental value of financial securities is unobserved. Early studies have attempted to address this issue by
utilizing observed variables, such as dividends, to estimate intrinsic values. A major drawback of such direct
approaches is that they depend crucially on the strong and, in most cases, unrealistic assumption that the true
data generating process for fundamentals is known. As argued by several researchers, model misspecifica-
tion or omitted variables can lead to false inference in favour of bubbles, rendering direct approaches invalid
(Hamilton and Whiteman, 1985; Flood and Garber, 1994; Gu¨rkaynak, 2008). To circumvent this problem,
more recent studies have employed indirect approaches that exploit information about market fundamen-
tals incorporated in derivative prices or survey data (Pavlidis et al., 2017, 2018). These studies show that
periodically collapsing bubbles create a wedge between actual realizations of future spot prices and mar-
ket expectations which, under general conditions, depends solely on the bubble process. As an implication,
rather than using estimates of intrinsic asset values to assess the presence of speculative bubbles, researchers
can examine the dynamics of the difference between actual future spot prices and market expectations. Un-
fortunately, indirect approaches based on future prices or survey data cannot be applied in the case of China
because derivative markets are at an early stage of development and survey data on market expectations that
cover periods long enough to allow a proper econometric analysis do not exist.1
1Equity warrants were briefly introduced in China in 2005–8 (Liu et al., 2014). By examining the behaviour of the warrants
market during this period, Xiong and Yu (2011) provide strong evidence in favour of speculative dynamics. Specifically, they show
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In this paper, we propose an alternative approach for testing for rational speculative bubbles that makes
use of the unique trading features of Chinese cross-listed securities. There is a large number of companies
incorporated in mainland China that simultaneously issue A shares on SSE or SZSE, and H shares on the
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK). For a given issuer, these two types of shares have identical voting
rights and exchange-rate-adjusted dividend payments (i.e., they have the same fundamentals) but differ in
terms of their accessibility by different groups of investors. Prior to the introduction of the Stock Connect
scheme in 2015, Chinese mainland investors could easily access A but not H shares, while international
and Hong Kong investors could readily access H but not A shares because of strict government regulations.
The segmentation of A- and H-share markets implied that price valuations of the same security could differ
across geographical locations without giving rise to arbitrage opportunities (Chen and Knez, 1995; Froot
and Dabora, 1999; Lamont and Thaler, 2003). The main idea of the present paper is that, in this setting
with limits to arbitrage, differences in speculative trading in Chinese mainland and Hong Kong can lead
to distinct bubbles processes in A- and H-share markets. As a consequence, share prices of cross-listed
companies can diverge despite having the same underlying fundamentals.
To demonstrate the theoretical implications of different speculative dynamics in A- and H-share markets,
we adopt a standard asset-pricing model with rational, risk-neutral investors and consider a periodically col-
lapsing bubble process in the market for A but not for H shares. We show that, in this framework, the A-H
price differential displays two characteristic properties when the bubble erupts. First, the price differential
grows (in expectation) at an exponential rate, thus displaying explosive dynamics and, second, it has predic-
tive content for future changes in A-share prices. These two properties can be examined empirically to test
for speculative bubbles by exploiting recent advances in recursive unit root tests and in predictive regression
tests with persistent regressors.
For our empirical application, we use data on the Hang Seng AH Premium Index and on a panel of
27 cross-listed companies spanning the period from January 2006 to December 2016. By employing the
popular Generalized Supremum Augmented Dickey Fuller (GSADF) of Phillips et al. (2015a,b) and its panel
version, we show that A-H price differentials display episodes of explosive dynamics. These episodes are
relative short and coincide with periods commonly considered to be characterized by speculative bubbles.
Namely, the Chinese stock market frenzy of 2007 and the Chinese Stock market crash of 2014-2015. A
similar conclusion is reached by looking at the predictive regression results, which indicate periods of in-
sample predictability, again, during 2007 and 2014-15. Overall, in line with the casino hypothesis, our
findings support the presence of speculative dynamics in the Chinese stock market.
The presence of distinct bubble processes in mainland China and Hong Kong provides a possible ex-
planation for one of the most intriguing puzzles in finance: the large and highly persistent share price
that the price of many put warrants with long maturities exceeded both the upper bound given by the strike price and the more
conservative fundamental value implied by the Black and Scholes model.
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deviations of Chinese cross-listed companies (Fernald and Rogers, 2002; Carpenter and Whitelaw, 2017).
In addition to speculation, a number of other factors have been put forth in the literature to explain foreign
share discounts, such as different attitudes toward risk, information asymmetries, changes in exchange rate
expectations, liquidity and transaction costs (Wang and Jiang, 2004; Chan et al., 2008; Chung et al., 2013).
As a final exercise, we use a dynamic panel probit methodology to investigate whether such factors can
explain the identified episodes of exuberance in A-H price differentials.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the institutional back-
ground of Chinese stock markets. Section 3 outlines the theoretical framework and describes the proposed
bubble detection methods. The following section deals with the empirical application of these methods to
A-H cross-listed shares. The same section provides a robustness exercise based on American Depository
Receipts, and also presents the results of the dynamic panel probit analysis. The final section concludes.
2 Institutional Background
China’s modern stock market opened only in the early 1990s with the re-establishment of SSE on
November 26, 1990 and the foundation of the SZHE on December 1, 1991. Upon their opening, SSE
listed eight companies and had a market capitalization of 1.2 billion renminbi (RMB), and SZHE listed
six companies with a total share capital of 273 million RMB. By 2016, the number of listings in SSE and
SZHE increased to 3,134 firms and their combined market capitalization reached 51 trillion RMB, which
corresponded to 68 percent of the country’s gross domestic product.
There are two types of tradable shares issued by Chinese firms listed on SSE and SZHE, the so-called
A and B shares. The market for A shares is by far the largest, accounting for the lion’s share of trading
volume and market capitalization. A shares are quoted in domestic currency (RMB) and, until recently,
were primarily traded by mainland Chinese citizens due to strict capital controls imposed by the Chinese
authorities.2 B shares, on the other hand, are traded in foreign currency (US dollars in Shanghai and Hong-
Kong dollars in Shenzhen) and were limited to foreign investors until February 2001, when China Securities
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) permitted their purchase by mainland citizens via the secondary market.
Since 1993, Chinese firms can also list shares on stock exchanges outside mainland China to raise
capital from abroad. Due to its geographical proximity and extensive socio-economic links to the mainland,
2During our sample period, China implemented a number of schemes aiming to gradually open its capital market to overseas
investors. In 2002, the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) program was launched, which allowed overseas financial
institutions that met a set of admission requirements to invest in Chinas securities markets subject to quotas. In 2011, a second
scheme, the Renminbi QFII (RQFII), was jointly established by the CSRC, the Peoples Bank of China, and the State Adminis-
tration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). The scheme allowed subsidiaries of domestic financial institutions in Hong Kong to invest
in mainland stock markets. As of February 2016, 279 foreign institutions had been granted QFII licenses and 158 institutions
RQFII licenses. The total QFII and RQFII quotas were 80.795 billion US dollars and 471.425 billion RMB, respectively, which
represented a small fraction of total market capitalization. (see http://english.sse.com.cn/investors/qfii/listandquota/).
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the most popular location is Hong Kong. Compared to SSE and SZHE, the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong
(SEHK) constitutes a more advanced financial market, it has adopted financial reporting standards that are
in alignment with the IFRS since 2005, and it is open to foreign investors. In 2016, 241 Chinese firms issued
shares in SEHK with a market capitalization exceeding 24 trillion Hong-Kong dollars. This type of shares,
referred to as H, is subject to the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited listing requirements, and
are quoted and traded in Hong Kong dollars. Analogously to the market for A shares, investors residing in
mainland China had very limited access to the market for H shares until 2015 due to tight restrictions on
capital movements.3
A key feature for our analysis is that a number of Chinese companies issue both A shares in mainland
China and H shares in Hong Kong. Apart from their trading location, these cross-listed securities are iden-
tical. They have the same legal rights and the same claims to exchange-rate adjusted dividends. Moreover,
cross-listed Chinese companies are required to disclose the same information to local and overseas investors
(Jia et al., 2017). Thus, in the absence of market frictions, A and H shares should trade for the same price.
However, due to the segmentation of A and H markets, deviations from the law of one price are typical, with
A shares usually trading at a premium.
INSERT TABLE 1
A potential explanation for the documented A-H price disparities is investor heterogeneity between
markets. On the one hand, the market for A shares is dominated by local, retail investors. These investors
account for more than 80 percent of the trading volume and, as survey evidence suggests, are less expe-
rienced than US investors and younger, with more than half being under 45 years of age (see, Gan et al.,
2014, Feng and Seasholes, 2003, and the 2013 CSRC securities report). On the other hand, retail investors
comprise only a small part of the Hong Kong market (26 percent during our sample period), with most of
the trading volume being generated by institutional investors (61 percent). Trading from overseas investors
(mainly from the United States and Europe) is also substantial, accounting for 42 percent of the total volume
(see Table 1). Mei et al. (2005), among others, argue that, because of their type and age composition, stock
market investors in mainland China are more likely to engage in intense speculative trading.
3In 2006, the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) program was launched which provided limited opportunities for
mainland investors to access overseas markets, including Hong Kong, via CSRC approved financial institutions. As of December
2015, 132 institutions had been granted QDII qualification, and SAFE had approved investment quotas of 90 billion US dollars. In
November 2014, the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect program was launched. Under this program, SSE and SEHK established
mutual order-routing connectivity which enabled mainland Chinese and international/Hong-Kong investors to trade specific securi-
ties listed in SEHK and SSE, respectively. The program is open to exchange participants who satisfy certain eligibility requirements,
and covers all cross-listed shares. Initially, trading was subject to daily and aggregate quotas. The northbound aggregate quotas
were set at 300 billion RMB, while the southbound aggregate at 250 billion RMB. Aggregate quotas were abolished in August
2016, but daily quotas are still in place. A similar channel that links the markets of Shenzhen and Hong Kong, the Shenzhen-Hong
Kong Stock Connect, was launched in December 2016.
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3 Rational Bubbles: Theory and Econometric Tests
We begin our analysis with a standard endowment economy in which rational, infinitely-lived investors
derive utility from personal consumption (Diba and Grossman, 1988; Gu¨rkaynak, 2008). In this economy,





where Cτ denotes the level of consumption at period τ , Eτ is the rational expectations operator conditional
on all available information at time τ , and β is a discount factor that is restricted to take values in (0,1)
so that time preferences are positive. The instantaneous utility function, u(·), is assumed to be concave,
increasing in Cτ , and continuously differentiable.
At each time period, τ , the investor is faced with a budget constraint. She receives an endowment yτ
which can be instantly consumed or used to purchase dividend-paying shares, sτ , in order to smooth future
consumption. Letting Pτ denote the price of a share in units of the consumption good and Dτ the dividend
payment, the budget constraint faced by the investor is given by
Cτ ≤ yτ + (sτ+1 − sτ )Pτ +Dτsτ . (2)
The first order condition for the investor’s utility maximization problem specified by (1) and (2) is given
by
Ptu(Ct) = βEτ [(Pt+1 +Dt+1)u′(Ct+1)]. (3)
Intuitively, the above Euler equation states that for a time-path of s to be optimal, an investor cannot become
better off by selling or buying a share at time t and reversing the transaction at time t+ 1. By assuming that
financial and goods markets clear and normalizing the number of existing shares to unity, Equation (3) can
be rewritten as
Et[qt+1]− β−1qt = −Et[u′(yt+1 +Dt+1)Dt+1], (4)
where qt ≡ Ptu′(yt +Dt). The general solution to this first order stochastic difference equation is given by
qt = Ft +Bt, (5)
where the first term of the RHS is referred to as the market fundamentals component because it depends on






Dt+j)Dt+j ]; while, the second term is a rational bubble component that satisfies the condition
Et[Bt+1] = β
−1Bt. (6)
In the empirical literature on rational bubbles, Bt is usually viewed to be driven by variables that are ex-
ogenous to the valuation process. Moreover, it is often assumed that utility is linear, which implies risk
neutrality and constant marginal utility. Under this latter assumption, the general solution to (4) simplifies
to the textbook asset pricing equation
Pt = Ft +Bt =
∞∑
j=1
βjEt[Dt+j ] +Bt, (7)
which links the current stock price to the bubble process Bt and to a market-fundamentals component that
equals the discounted value of expected future dividends.
The above analysis has important implications for econometric tests for rational speculative bubbles. By
condition (6), if a bubble exists then it will grow, in expectation, geometrically at the rate of β−1 − 1. It
follows from Equation (7) that the stock price will display explosive dynamics and diverge from its funda-
mental value over time.4 This prediction has motivated a plethora of studies that employ non-stationarity
tests to examine the presence of speculative bubbles in financial markets. Some studies have applied unit
root tests to stock prices and price-to-fundamentals ratios (such as stock prices to dividends). Others have
examined the existence of cointegrating relationships between prices and observed market fundamentals.
The main drawback of such direct approaches is that they rely on strong assumptions about the data generat-
ing process for market fundamentals which are difficult to verify in practice. Specifically, tests on raw prices
implicitly assume that the fundamental component in (7) does not display explosive dynamics in sample.
Whilst, tests that control for market fundamentals by using observed economic and financial variables are
subject to model misspecification and omitted-variable problems. As argued by several researchers, these
deficiencies can lead to false inference (Gu¨rkaynak, 2008).
3.1 Cross-Listed Securities
Consider an extension of the above framework to two segmented, but otherwise identical economies, A
and H, in which investors trade shares of the same storable asset locally. In this setting, there is an asset
4The increasing difference between actual and intrinsic asset values arises because of investors’ expectation to sell the asset at
an even higher price in a future date. Note, however, that these large, expected capital gains do not imply arbitrage opportunities
since they are already priced in the market. That is, the evolution of asset prices satisfies the requirement of market efficiency by
construction.
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pricing equation for each economy given by





with i = A,H . Because investors are entitled to the same stream of dividend payments irrespective of
their location, their valuations for the market fundamental components of A- and H-share prices satisfy
FAt = F
H





This is so because arbitrage between markets is not feasible and market efficiency dictates that {Bit}∞t=0 can
be any sequence of random variables that satisfies condition (6). Thus, allowing for speculative bubbles in
financial markets gives rise to the possibility of non-unique asset price paths for A and H shares,
PAt − PHt = BAt −BHt , (9)
and can lead to violations of the law of one price. The above expression lies in the heart of our analysis. It
suggests that the price differential between A and H shares, first, does not depend on market fundamentals
and, second, it displays the same behaviour as the difference in bubble sequences. As long as BAt and B
H
t
are not co-explosive, the price differential will exhibit explosive dynamics (see Nielsen, 2010). Therefore,
one can test for the presence of distinct speculative bubbles, while remaining agnostic about the intrinsic
value of the asset, by simply running right-tailed unit root tests on PAt − PHt .
Recursive Unit Root Tests The property that PAt −PHt is explosive when BAt and BHt do not co-explode
holds irrespective of the type of speculative bubble. The simplest scenario is that of a linear AR(1) process
for BAt
BAt+1 = β
−1BAt + t+1, (10)
where t+1 ∼ iid(0, σ2 ), and no bubbles in the market for H shares, BHt = 0. For the case of the Chinese
market, it is more realistic to presume that bubbles, if they exist, are periodically collapsing. For expositional






t + t+1, with prob. pi
t+1, with prob. 1− pi.
(11)
This process switches between two states. In the first state, it grows geometrically at the higher than average
rate of 1/(βpi)− 1, whilst in the second state it collapses to a white noise. In expectation, the growth rate of
BAt equals β
−1 − 1 and, therefore, Equation (11) satisfies (6). By resembling the behaviour of the bubble
process, the price differential
PAt − PHt = BAt , (12)
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also alternates between an explosive and a stationary state. As will be shown in the following section, this
behaviour is in line with the price rallies and subsequent collapses that have characterized the A-H premium
index over the last decades.
From an empirical perspective, the presence of boom-bust dynamics in PAt − PHt implies that standard
unit root tests based on linear, time-invariant regression equations may display extremely low power to
detect bubbles. A number of studies illustrate that such tests frequently lead to finding spurious stationarity
even though asset prices driven by periodically-collapsing bubbles are inherently explosive (see, e.g., Evans,
1991). To deal with this shortcoming, in this paper we employ the GSADF test of Phillips et al. (2015a,b)
and its panel version proposed by Pavlidis et al. (2016). The GSADF test has a number of attractive features.
First, due to its recursive nature, it is consistent with multiple changes in regime. Second, it displays accurate
size and good power properties and in many cases is superior to alternative tests for periodically-collapsing
bubbles (for simulation evidence, see Phillips et al., 2015a, and Homm and Breitung, 2012). And third, it
permits identification of the periods during which the series under examination displays explosive dynamics.
The panel version, on the other hand, introduces a rich specification, that captures the heterogeneity and
cross-sectional dependencies of constituent series, in order to test for overall exuberance. By doing so,
it can lead to substantial power gains in comparison to univariate unit root procedures applied to aggregate
series (Pavlidis et al., 2019). A description of the GSADF and panel GSADF tests can be found in Appendix
A.1.
Rolling Predictive Regressions The presence of distinct asset price bubbles has also implications for
predictability tests on stock prices. Consider the following predictive regression
PAt+1 − PAt = α0 + α1(PAt − PHt ) + ut+1, (13)
where α0 and α1 are regression coefficients, and the error term ut+1 ∼ iid(0, σ2u). In the absence of
speculative bubbles and under risk neutrality, the efficient market hypothesis postulates that movements in
stock prices are unpredictable and, therefore, the value of the slope coefficient in (13) is continuously equal
to zero. However, this prediction may fail in the presence of distinct bubbles. To illustrate this point most
simply, let fundamentals follow a random walk process, Ft+1 = Ft + vt+1, and consider again the case of
an ongoing bubble in the market for A shares but no bubble in the market for H shares. The least squares
estimate for the slope coefficient in regression (13) is
α̂1 =
ĉov(PAt+1 − PAt , PAt − PHt )
v̂ar(PAt − PHt )
. (14)
9
We have already obtained an expression for the regressor in (14), see Equation (12). Using Equation (11),
we can also obtain the following expression for the regressand
PAt+1 − PAt =
1− pi
βpi
BAt + t+1 + vt+1. (15)




















and of ĉov(vt+1, BAt )/v̂ar(B
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and price movements in A shares become predictable. Note, however, that this ex post predictability cannot
be exploited in real time by investors, who rationally price A shares by attaching a non-zero probability
to the bubble bursting, and therefore it does not imply rejection of market efficiency. Note also that, in
the absence of bubbles, explosive fundamentals cannot cause α1 to deviate from zero since in this case the
regressor will be fixed at PAt − PHt = 0.
The above analysis suggests that, if the null of non-explosive dynamics in PAt − PHt is rejected, then
researchers can further examine the presence of speculative bubbles by sequentially testing the hypothesis
of no predictability, H0 : α1 = 0, against the one-sided alternative H1 : α1 > 0. An issue of concern in this
framework is that the predictor in regression (13) is highly persistent under the alternative hypothesis. As
a consequence, the slope coefficients α1 follows a non-standard limiting distribution, and results based on
conventional inference methods can be misleading (Phillips, 2014). Several methods have been proposed
in the literature to draw valid statistical inference in this setting, such as the efficient Q-test of Campbell
and Yogo (2006), the conditional likelihood approach of Jansson and Moreira (2006), the nearly optimal
test of Elliott et al. (2015), and the bootstrap procedures of Kilian (1999) and Kilian and Taylor (2003). We
adopt a rolling-window approach that consists of sequentially estimating predictive regressions and drawing
statistical inference using the IVX instrumentation method of Phillips and Magdalinos (2009), Phillips and
Lee (2013), and Kostakis et al. (2015). The IVX method is particularly attractive in this setting because it
allows robust chi-square inference for a wide range of AR processes, from stationary to mildly explosive.
For a description of the IVX testing procedure, the interested reader is referred to Appendix A.2.
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4 Empirical Results
In this section, we apply the above bubble detection methods to data on Chinese A-H twin shares. We
also provide two robustness checks. The first examines Chinese American Depository Receipts traded in the
New York Stock Exchange, and the second explores the ability of sources, other than speculative bubbles,
to explain episodes of exuberance in A and H share price differences.
4.1 A and H Shares
Data For our main empirical analysis, we employ the Hang Seng AH premium index, and a balanced panel
of 27 Chinese companies simultaneously listed on SEHK and SSE or SZHE. The data are downloaded from
Thomson Reuters Datastream and cover the period from the first week of January 2006 to the last week of
December 2016.5 The reason for setting the start date at January 2006 is twofold. On the one hand, this
choice allows us to examine the Chinese stock market frenzy of 2007 and, on the other, we avoid potential
biases related to, first, the A-share market reforms that occurred in April 2005 and, second, the change in the
exchange-rate regime that took place in July of the same year.6 With regard to the data frequency, the use of
weekly prices enables us examine a large sample size (T =575 observations), which may lead to substantial
power gains in detecting periodically-collapsing bubbles, especially if these are short-lived.
Table 2 reports the list of companies together with their stock ticker, the stock exchange on which they
are listed, and the corresponding market sector. As can be seen from the table, the majority of shares (23
out of 27) are traded on SSE, which accounts for the largest share of total market capitalization in mainland
China. Furthermore, the sample spans all but three stock market sectors, from energy and materials to
utilities, health care and information technology. From this perspective, the sample is quite representative
of the market.
INSERT TABLE 2
The three sectors not covered in our analysis are communications, financial, and real estate. Regarding
the latter, China has experienced a spectacular real estate boom during the last decades. Fang et al. (2016)
show that real estate prices in the four most developed metropolitan areas (Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen,
5The entire population of companies that listed both A and H shares throughout our sample period is 29. We have discarded two
companies, Luoyang Glass and Hisense Kelon Electrical Holdings, due to the large number of missing observations, which exceeds
15% of the sample size. For the remaining companies, for which the percentage of missing data is small (less than 6%), we have
replaced missing data with the latest available observation.
6On the 29th of April 2005, the Chinese government implemented the Split Share Structure Reform which led to a substantial
reduction in the number of state owned non-tradable shares. On the 21st of July 2005, China abandoned its peg to the US dollar,
which caused an immediate appreciation to 8.11 RMB per US dollar. Since then, China has adopted a managed floating exchange
rate with reference to a basket of foreign currencies.
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and Guangzhou) grew by 13 percent per annum from 2003 to 2013; and Wu et al. (2015) find that real land
prices in 35 major Chinese cities increased by a factor of five for a sample period similar to ours. The sheer
magnitude of these price changes makes the Chinese real estate boom even more spectacular than the one
experienced by the US in the 2000s, and has raised concerns about the presence of speculative dynamics in
the sector (Glaeser et al., 2017; Chen and Wen, 2017). In line with these concerns, several studies provide
evidence in favour of bubble-type dynamics in China’s real estate market (Zhi et al., 2019; Mao and Shen,
2019). Hence, if anything, the omission of real estate from our analysis may bias the results in favour of the
no-bubble null hypothesis.
Summary Statistics Table 3 presents descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations, minimum and
maximum values, and AR(1) coefficient estimates) of the A- to H-share price ratios for the 27 cross-listed
companies. To allow meaningful comparisons between markets, A-share prices are converted to Hong-Kong
dollars. Two stylized facts about the size and the dynamics of A-H price disparities emerge. The first is that
A shares typically sell at a premium relative to H shares. As is evident from Columns 2 and 4 of Table 3,
for the vast majority of companies, this premium is on average substantial, and can reach extreme values
in parts of the sample. A prime example is Sinopec Oilfie, whose A shares traded at almost three times the
price of H shares on average, and at slightly less than nine times the price of H shares in October 2008.
The second fact that emerges is that A-H price ratios are highly persistent, with AR(1) coefficient estimates
very close to unity. The above well-documented facts are difficult to reconcile with standard asset-pricing
models, giving rise to the so-called A-H premium puzzle.
INSERT TABLE 3 & Figure 1
The two stylized facts are also apparent when looking at the aggregate behaviour of A- and H-share
prices. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the Hang Seng AH premium index over time. This index measures
the price premium/discount of A shares over H shares for the largest and most liquid cross-listed Chinese
companies. Similarly to individual companies, the index typically takes values above its parity value of
100, averaging around 120 and reaching a maximum of 195 in 2008. The index is also highly persistent,
displaying extraordinary long swings. Interestingly, the most notable AH premium rallies coincide with the
two Chinese stock market ‘bubbles’: the market frenzy of 2007 and the period preceding the market crash
of 2015. Given that the AH premium reflects deviations of asset prices from fundamentals, Figure 1 hints
that the boom episodes in mainland China were driven by speculative trading.
Econometrics Results To formally examine the existence of speculative bubbles in the Chinese stock
market, we run standard ADF and GSADF tests on the AH premium index and on the A-H price differentials
12
for the 27 cross-listed companies. Following the recommendation of Phillips et al. (2015a,b), we choose a
short lag length, k = 1, and set the minimum window size in the recursive GSADF procedure by using the
rule of thumb r0 = 0.01 + 1.8/
√
T . Overall, the unit root test results provide several new insights about the
integration properties of the series.
INSERT TABLE 4
Looking at the GSADF test statistic for the AH index and the panel GSADF statistic for the group of
companies, presented in Table 4,, we observe that the null hypothesis of no explosive behaviour can be
rejected by both tests at all conventional significance levels. Thus, there is strong evidence of speculative
bubbles in A-H share price differentials at the aggregate level. Although informative about the overall
behaviour of the Chinese stock market, this finding does not shed light on whether bubbles are widespread
across cross-listed companies. This is so because both the univariate and the panel GSADF tests can, in
principle, reject the null even if a single constituent series displays exuberance.7 However, the results for the
disaggregate data suggest that this is not the case. From the 27 cross-listed securities, 21 have statistically
significant GSADF statistics at the one percent significance level, 23 at the five percent, and 24 at the ten
percent. The conclusion that emerges is that speculative bubbles are prevalent across companies.
Another point that is worth noting is that, although the majority of GSADF statistics exceed the 95 per-
cent critical value, the ADF statistics fail to do so. These findings are not inconsistent. As aforementioned,
standard unit root tests, including the ADF, have extremely low power in detecting speculative bubbles
which collapse in sample. Hence, taken together, the ADF and GSADF test results imply that A-H price
differences display explosive dynamics during parts of, but not the entire, sample.
INSERT FIGURES 2 & 3
To identify these periods of exuberance, we start by plotting the Backward Supremum ADF (BSADF)
statistics for the A-H premium index, and the panel BSADF statistics for the 27 cross-listed companies
together with their corresponding 95 percent critical value sequence in Figure 2. A comparison of the test
statistics with their critical values indicates that speculative bubbles occurred in 2007 and 2014-15. This
conclusion is supported further by the results for individual companies. Figure 3 shows the periods of
exuberance for each of the 24 cross-listed securities that have statistically significant GSADF statistics at
7For the univariate GSADF test, this property follows from the fact that the combination of the explosive constituent series with
other unit root and/or stationary processes results in an explosive AH index, and for the panel test, it is a direct implication of the
alternative hypothesis of at least one of the elements of the panel displaying explosive dynamics.
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the five percent level. As is evident from the figure, the episodes of exuberance are clustered around 2007-08
and 2014-15. The fact that bubble episodes are highly synchronized across companies points to the existence
of a market-wide speculative factor that drove A-share prices to diverge from their fundamental values, and
led to the stock market frenzy of 2007 and the market crash of 2014-15. The presence of such a factor
is also in accordance with previous studies which show that changes in foreign share discounts are highly
correlated with movements in the market they trade (Froot and Dabora, 1999).
Having established the presence of explosive dynamics in A-H twin share prices, we run rolling pre-
dictive regressions of the form given by Equation (13). To allow direct comparisons with the unit root test
results, the rolling window size is set equal to the minimum window size r0. Figure 4 shows the periods
of predictability for each of the cross-listed securities in our sample. In accordance with the pattern of the
BSADF statistics, we observe that the majority of IVX statistics become positive and statistically significant
in 2007 and in 2014-15. Thus, as suggested by the theoretical analysis of Section 3, A-H price differences
have predictive content for future movements in A-share prices during periods of exuberance. Overall, the
above results provide novel evidence in support of speculative bubbles in China’s stock market.
4.2 Chinese American Depository Receipts
As a robustness check, we repeat the above analysis using a subset of our sample of Chinese companies
for which American Depository Receipts (ADRs) are traded on the New York Stock Exchange. An ADR
represents a bundle of H shares held in trust by a U.S. depository bank. On the one hand, these securities
make it easier for U.S. investors to trade shares of companies incorporated outside the U.S. and, on the
other, they provide a source of capital for China. Like A and H shares, ADRs entitle investors to the same
exchange-rate-adjusted dividend payments and capital gains. However, contrary to A and H shares, limits to
arbitrage between Hong Kong and the U.S. market are far less constraining. If an ADR sells at a premium, a
financial intermediary can purchase H shares in Hong Kong, create a new ADR, and make an instant profit
(Lamont and Thaler, 2003). Thus, arbitrage should restrict ADR and H-share prices from diverging due to
speculation, but not ADR and A-share prices.
INSERT TABLE 5, FIGURES 5 & 6
Our empirical results are in line with this hypothesis. Starting with the unit root test statistics presented
in Table 5, we observe that the univariate GSADF and panel GSADF tests always fail to reject the null of
non-explosive dynamics in ADR-H price differentials. On the contrary, there is strong evidence in favour
of explosive dynamics for A-ADR price pairs, with all test statistics being significant at the one percent
significance level. The results for the BSADF statistics, summarized in Figure 5, indicate that the periods
14
of exuberance in the latter series are again synchronized, taking place in 2007 and 2014-15. Thus, they
coincide with those for A-H share prices. Similarly, the IVX predictive regressions, presented in Figure 6,
suggest that A-ADR price differentials contain valuable information for predicting A-share price movements
during these periods.
4.3 Alternative Sources of AH Premia
Several studies have attempted to explain the AH premium puzzle by looking at market and firm-specific
factors which, under segmented markets, can cause price valuations of the same asset to differ across geo-
graphical locations (Wang and Jiang, 2004; Cai et al., 2011; Seasholes and Liu, 2011; Chung et al., 2013).
In this section, we explore whether changes in such factors are linked to periods of exuberance in A-H price
differentials. For doing so, we employ a dynamic panel probit (DPP).
Let bi,t denote a binary bubble indicator, which takes the value of unity when the BSADF statistic for
firm i exceeds its critical value at time t, and zero otherwise. The DPP model can be defined in reference to
a theoretical relationship of the form
b?i,t = X
′
i,tβ + i,t, (17)
where b?i,t is an unobservable variable that determines the occurrence of a bubble in the share price of firm
i at time t, Xi,t is a vector of covariates that includes a constant, the lag value of bi,t, and market and firm-
specific variables, β is a coefficient vector, and i,t is a normally distributed error term. The binary bubble
indicator bi,t is related to the latent variable b?i,t according to
bi,t =
{
1, if b?i,t > 0
0, otherwise,
(18)
and the corresponding DPP model is given by
Pr(bi,t = 1|Xi,t) = Φ(X ′i,tβ), (19)
where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative Gaussian distribution function. This model can be estimated via partial
maximum likelihood, and the corresponding pooled probit estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal
(Wooldridge, 2001, Ch. 13).
In line with previous literature, we consider the following potential sources of AH premia:
• Differences in Risk Appetite. The differential risk hypothesis postulates that A shares may sell at a
premium because investors in mainland China are less risk averse in comparison to overseas investors
and therefore demand a lower compensation for bearing risk (Ma, 1996). We proxy differences in risk
appetite (risk) by the ratio of variances of A- and H-share returns (Wang and Jiang, 2004; Chung et
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al., 2013). Similarly to Wang and Jiang (2004), we measure the variance of returns using the squared
residuals of a regression of returns on their one-period lagged values and local market index returns.
• Differences in Liquidity. According to the liquidity hypothesis, investor require compensation in the
form of lower prices for purchasing assets which are relatively less liquid and have higher transaction
costs (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). We employ two proxies to capture differences in liquidity be-
tween markets. The first is given by the ratio of trading volumes (volume). The second is a transaction
cost-based liquidity measure, defined as the difference between the bid-ask spreads of A and H shares
(spread).
• Changes in Exchange Rate Expectations. Because firms incorporated in mainland China pay divi-
dends in RMB, an expected depreciation of the Chinese currency implies a reduction in the expected
future payoffs received by overseas investors from holding H shares. By altering the present value of
H shares, movements in exchange rate expectations can cause A- and H-share prices to diverge. A
natural way to capture this effect is to include changes in (log) forward exchange rates (forward) in
the DPP model. Unfortunately, forward exchange rates are only available for the period beginning in
June 2009, which does not cover the first bubble episode in Chinese stock markets. To deal with this
shortcoming, we use spot exchange rate returns (spot) in our main analysis. The results for forward
rates, which are reported in Appendix A.3, are qualitatively similar.
• Differences in Aggregate Market Conditions. Previous studies show that aggregate market conditions
are correlated with AH premia (Ma, 1996; Wang and Jiang, 2004; Chung et al., 2013). The findings
of these studies suggest that when mainland Chinese stock markets are more bullish than the Hong
Kong market, A-H price differentials tend to widen and vice versa. Though typically this behaviour is
attributed to investor sentiment (see, e.g., Stambaugh et al., 2012, and the references therein) it is also
consistent with the presence of a market-wide rational bubble that drives the prices of individual Chi-
nese securities (as suggested by the IVX and BSADF results). Irrespective of whether the mechanism
generating security prices involves rational bubbles or sentimental investors, differences in aggregate
market conditions constitute a speculative source of AH premia and, in this aspect, differ from the
factors outlined above which fall in the category of market fundamentals.8 To proxy for relative mar-
ket conditions, we follow Chung et al. (2013) and use the logarithm of the A-share price index over
the H-share price index (market).
The above set of covariates does not account for two potential determinants of AH premia: macroeco-
nomic conditions and asymmetric information. The reason for not examining the former is twofold. First,
8It should be noted that behavioural models establish a link between bubbles, transaction volume, and volatility (Scheinkman
and Xiong, 2003; Scheinkman, 2014), which makes the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental factors even less
clear.
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because macroeconomic variables are observed at a low frequency (monthly or quarterly), their use requires
temporal aggregation of the high-frequency financial variables and, most importantly, of the bubble indicator
process bi,t. This change in frequency can induce non-random measurement error in the left hand side vari-
able of the probit model (especially given that the identified episodes of exuberance are relatively short) and
thereby result in biased and inconsistent regression estimates (Hausman, 2001). Second, as shown by pre-
vious literature, macroeconomic variables do not appear to have a statistically significant relationship with
movements in AH premia so that their omission should not have a substantial impact on our results (Chung
et al., 2013). With regard to information asymmetries between local and overseas investors, a proxy for this
factor is given by market capitalization. However, market capitalization is itself a function of share prices
and, as such, is directly influenced by the presence of speculative bubbles. Consequently, this proxy cannot
shed light on whether episodes of exuberance in A-H price differentials are due to asymmetric information
or speculation.
INSERT TABLE 6
Having specified the set of explanatory variables, we turn to the DPP estimation results. Table 6
presents coefficient estimates, marginal effects, standard errors, likelihood ratio (LR) statistics, and Mc-
Fadden R2s for two specifications, DPP1 and DPP2. In DPP1, the set of covariates is restricted to an
intercept, the lagged value of the bubble indicator, and the measure of relative market conditions, i.e.,
Xi,t = (1, bi,t−1,market). While, in DPP2, we also include the four variables that account for funda-
mental sources, i.e., Xi,t = (1, bi,t−1,market, risk, volume, spread, spot). Overall, the estimation results for
the two DPP models suggest that fundamental sources cannot explain episodes of exuberance in A-H price
differentials. The coefficients on risk, volume, spread and spot are individually statistically insignificant,
and the LR test fails to reject the joint null hypothesis that all four coefficients are equal to zero with a
p-value of 0.451. Furthermore, the difference between the McFadden R2s of the restricted and unrestricted
models is minimal. On the other hand, the coefficient on the market variable, which proxies for differences
in market-wide speculation, is statistically significant and positive. This implies that as mainland Chinese
markets become more bullish in comparison to the Hong-Kong market, there is a higher probability of an
episode of exuberance in A-H price differentials occurring. According to the marginal effect estimates for
DPP1 and DPP2 the magnitude of this relationship is substantial, with a one percent increase in the log dif-
ference between the A- and H-share price indices being associated with an eleven percentage points increase
in the probability of exuberance. In summary, the above result reinforce the view that speculative bubbles
are present in the Chinese stock market.
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5 Conclusion
In the presence of capital controls, speculative bubbles can cause financial assets with the same market
fundamentals to trade at different prices in different locations. These deviations from the law of one price
display, like the bubble process, explosive dynamics and have predictive content for equity price movements.
Based on these two predictions, we proposed a new approach for bubble detection in segmented markets that
utilizes recursive unit root tests and predictive regressions. By applying these methods to data on Chinese
cross-listed shares, we found strong evidence in favour of speculative dynamics. Interestingly, for the vast
majority of cross-listed securities, the identified periods of exuberance coincide with the Chinese stock
market frenzy of 2007 and the market crash of 2014-15. These findings point to a market-wide speculative
factor driving Chinese share prices.
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A Appendix
The Appendix describes the econometric methods employed to test for speculative bubbles, and provides
technical details for their estimation. Specifically, it outlines the GSADF test of Phillips et al. (2015a,b),
the proposed extension to a panel setting of Pavlidis et al. (2016), and the IVX method of Phillips and
Magdalinos (2009) and Kostakis et al. (2015). The last section of the Appendix presents estimation results
for the dynamic panel probit that includes changes in forward exchange rates.
A.1 Recursive Unit Root Tests
The GSADF Test Consider the following augmented Dickey-Fuller regression equation
∆yt = ar1,r2 + γr1,r2yt−1 +
k∑
j=1
ψjr1,r2∆yt−j + t, (20)
where yt denotes a time series process, t
iid∼ N(0, σ2r1,r2), and r1 and r2 denote fractions of the total
sample size that specify the starting and ending points of a subsample period. We are interested in testing
the null hypothesis of a unit root, H0 : γr1,r2 = 0, against the alternative of explosive behaviour in yt,
H1 : γr1,r2 > 0. Let
ADFr2r1 = γ̂r1,r2/s.e.(γ̂r1,r2)
denote the test statistic corresponding to this null hypothesis. Phillips et al. (2015a) propose a recursive-
rolling testing procedure which consists of estimating the ADF regression (20) on a large number of sub-
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where r0 denotes the minimum window size, rw = r2 − r1, and W is the standard brownian motion.
If the GSADF test rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root then, in a second stage, the exact period(s)
during which the series under examination displayed explosive dynamics can be identified. The dating
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{r2 : BSADFr2(r0) > scuβTr2 },
and the termination date to the first observation after which the BSADF falls below its critical value
r̂f = inf
r2∈[r0,1]
{r2 : BSADFr2(r0) < scuβTr2 },
where scuβTr2 is the 1− βT critical value of the supremum ADF test based on br2T c observations, and βT is
the chosen significance level.
The computation of the BSADF and GSADF test statistics requires the selection of the minimum
window size r0 and the lag length k. Following Phillips et al. (2015a), we use the rule-of-thumb r0 =
0.01 + 1.8/
√
T , and select a short lag length, k = 1. The implementation of the unit root tests also neces-
sitates the limit distributions of the BSADF and GSADF test statistics, which are non-standard. To obtain
finite-sample critical values, we simulate 2000 random walk processes with N(0, 1) errors.
The Panel GSADF Test Inspired by the work of Im et al. (2003), Pavlidis et al. (2016) propose an exten-
sion of the GSADF test procedure to heterogeneous panels. Consider the multivariate version of the ADF
regression equation
∆yi,t = ai,r1,r2 + γi,r1,r2yi,t−1 +
∑k
j=1
ψji,r1,r2∆yi,t−j + i,t, (22)
where i = 1, . . . , N , denotes the cross-listed company index. The null hypothesis of the panel test is that all
N cross-listed companies have a unit root, H0 : γi,r1,r2 = 0, against the alternative of explosive behaviour
in a subset of units, H1 : γi,r1,r2 > 0 for some i. This alternative allows for γi,r1,r2 to differ across units
and, therefore, is more general than approaches based on the homogeneous alternative hypothesis.
The panel procedure of Pavlidis et al. (2016) is based on the average of the individual BSADF statistics







which provides a measure of overall exuberance in the sample. Given (23), the definition of the panel
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GSADF is simply
panel GSADF (r0) = sup
r2∈[r0,1]
panel BSADFr2(r0). (24)
The results of Maddala and Wu (1999) and Chang (2004) show that the distribution of panel unit root tests
based on mean statistics is not invariant to cross-sectional dependence of the error terms i. To deal with this
complication, Pavlidis et al. (2016) employ a sieve bootstrap procedure to draw statistical inference. The
procedure consists of the following steps:
1. For each panel unit i, impose the null hypothesis and fit the restricted ADF regression,




to obtain aˆi,r1,r2 , ψ
j
i,r1,r2
for j = 1, . . . , k, and ˆi.
2. To preserve the dependence structure of the error term, generate bootstrap residuals, bi,t, by sampling
with replacement columns from the residual matrix ˆ.
3. Recursively simulate artificial samples for first differences,













4. Compute the sequence of panel BSADF statistics and the panel GSADF statistic for the simulated
series.
5. Repeat steps 2 to 4 one thousand times to obtain the empirical distribution of the test statistics under
the null.
Similarly to the univariate testing procedure, dating episodes of overall exuberance consists of com-
paring the panel BSADF with the sequence of critical values obtained from the bootstrap procedure. The
origination date is set equal to the first observation that the panel BSADF statistic exceeds the 1− βT criti-
cal value, and the termination date is set equal to the first observation that the Panel BSADF falls below the
1− βT critical value.
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A.2 The IVX Testing Procedure
Consider the following bivariate system
yt+1 = αxt + u1,t+1, (25)
xt+1 = ρxt + u2,t+1, (26)
where the errors (u1,t+1, u2,t+1)′ follow a martingale difference sequence, and ρ = 1+c/T γ for some γ ≥ 0.
In this setting, the AR coefficient for the regressor is allowed to take a wide range of values. Depending on
the value of c and γ, the regressor can be an i) integrated (c = 0 or γ > 1), ii) local-to-unity (c 6= 0 and
γ = 1), iii) near stationary (c < 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1)), iv) locally explosive (c > 0 and γ = 1), or v) mildly
explosive (c > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1)) process. The IVX procedure is based on the creation of an instrument zt
which, although relies on the regressor, always falls in the near stationary category iii. In particular, given
an artificial autoregressive scalar,
ρz = 1 + cz/T
ζ , ζ ∈ (0, 1), cz < 0, (27)
the IVX instrument is initialized at zero and sequentially computed for the remaining periods according to
zt = ρzzt−1 + ∆xt. (28)






has the following limit theory
T
1+ζ
2 (αˆIVX − α) =⇒ ψ′,





is standard normal (Phillips and Magdalinos, 2009; Kostakis et al., 2015; Phillips and Lee, 2013). Simulation
results in Kostakis et al. (2015) and Pavlidis et al. (2017) indicate that the IVX test has good size and power
properties in finite samples.
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Tables & Figures
TABLE 1 – DISTRIBUTION OF CASH MARKET TRADING VOLUME BY INVESTOR TYPE AND ORIGIN
2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 Full Sample
Retail Total 32% 29% 29% 25% 26% 21% 23% 25% 27% 26%
- Local Retail 28% 26% 25% 21% 22% 17% 18% 20% 19% 22%
- Overseas Retail 4% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 8% 5%
Institutional Total 64% 65% 62% 65% 62% 63% 61% 58% 50% 61%
- Local Institutional 25% 27% 24% 23% 20% 21% 20% 24% 19% 23%
- Overseas Institutional 39% 38% 38% 42% 42% 42% 41% 34% 31% 39%
Other 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 15% 16% 16% 22% 12%
US+Europe 71% 74% 70% 69% 69% 69% 67% 64% 56% 68%
Asia 22% 22% 26% 27% 22% 21% 24% 29% 36% 25%
Source: Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited Cash Market Transaction Surveys from 2007 to 2016.
TABLE 2 – CHINESE CROSS-LISTED COMPANIES
Company Name Abbreviation Sector A-Ticker H-Ticker ADR-Ticker
Angang Steel Angang Materials 000898.SZ 0347.HK
Anhui Conch Cement Anhui Conch Materials 600585.SS 0914.HK
Anhui Expressway Anhui Express Industrials 600012.SS 0995.HK
Guangzhou Baiyunshan Pharmaceutical Holdings Baiyunshan Health Care 600332.SS 0874.HK
China Eastern Airlines China East Air Industrials 600115.SS 0670.HK CEA
China Petroleum & Chemical China Petroleu Energy 600028.SS 0386.HK SNP
COSCO Shipping Energy Transportation Cosco Shipping Industrials 600026.SS 1138.HK
CSSC Offshore & Marine Engineering Group CSSC Marine En Industrials 600685.SS 0317.HK
Dongfang Electric Dongfang Elec Industrials 600875.SS 1072.HK
Huadian Power International Huadian Power Utilities 600027.SS 1071.HK
Huaneng Power International Inc Huaneng Power Utilities 600011.SS 0902.HK HNP
Jiangsu Expressway Jiangsu Exp Industrials 600377.SS 0177.HK
Jiangxi Copper Jiangxi Copper Materials 600362.SS 0358.HK
Beijing Jingcheng Machinery Electric Jingcheng Mach Industrials 600860.SS 0187.HK
Shenji Group Kunming Machine Tool Kunming Machin Industrials 600806.SS 0300.HK
Maanshan Iron & Steel Maanshan Iron Materials 600808.SS 0323.HK
Nanjing Panda Electronics Nanjing Panda Information Technology 600775.SS 0553.HK
Northeast Electric Development Northeast Elec Industrials 000585.SZ 0042.HK
Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical S Sh Pechem Materials 600688.SS 0338.HK SHI
Sinopec Oilfield Service Sinopec Oilfie Energy 600871.SS 1033.HK
China Southern Airlines Southern Air Industrials 600029.SS 1055.HK ZNH
Shenzhen Expressway Sz Expressway Industrials 600548.SS 0548.HK
Tianjin Capital Environmental Protection Group Tianjin Cap Industrials 600874.SS 1065.HK
Tsingtao Brewery Tsingtao Brew Consumer Staples 600600.SS 0168.HK
Shandong Xinhua Pharmaceutical Xinhua Pharm Health Care 000756.SZ 0719.HK
Yanzhou Coal Mining Yanzhou Coal Energy 600188.SS 1171.HK
ZTE ZTE Information Technology 000063.SZ 0763.HK
Notes: SS, SZ, and HK indicate shares listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and the Stock Exchange of Hong
Kong, respectively. All American Depository Receipts (ADRs) are traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
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TABLE 3 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF A- TO H-SHARE PRICE RATIOS
Company Mean SD Min Max AR(1)
Angang 1.080 0.280 0.704 2.313 0.953
Anhui Conch 0.929 0.145 0.603 1.491 0.930
Anhui Express 1.449 0.475 0.863 3.184 0.989
Baiyunshan 1.949 0.524 1.200 3.559 0.969
China East Air 2.222 0.877 1.128 5.949 0.969
China Petroleu 1.381 0.419 0.838 2.553 0.978
Cosco Shipping 1.443 0.382 0.866 2.768 0.955
CSSC Marine En 1.910 0.711 0.816 3.843 0.981
Dongfang Elec 1.449 0.349 0.861 2.772 0.954
Huadian Power 1.937 0.686 0.816 3.950 0.976
Huaneng Power 1.380 0.345 0.787 2.184 0.968
Jiangsu Exp 1.029 0.163 0.706 1.554 0.933
Jiangxi Copper 1.874 0.505 1.047 3.589 0.957
Jingcheng Mach 3.293 0.871 1.571 7.375 0.945
Kunming Machin 2.792 0.717 0.905 5.505 0.959
Maanshan Iron 1.444 0.473 0.838 3.530 0.962
Nanjing Panda 3.684 1.043 1.673 6.180 0.972
Northeast Elec 3.469 0.856 1.404 7.344 0.947
S Sh Pechem 2.895 0.904 1.208 5.070 0.971
Sinopec Oilfie 3.800 1.189 1.273 8.851 0.962
Southern Air 1.933 0.681 1.008 4.258 0.973
Sz Expressway 1.495 0.295 0.892 2.610 0.943
Tianjin Cap 2.958 0.886 1.430 6.569 0.969
Tsingtao Brew 1.110 0.207 0.808 1.824 0.951
Xinhua Pharm 2.972 0.557 1.684 4.647 0.943
Yanzhou Coal 1.837 0.605 0.870 3.591 0.966
ZTE 1.205 0.238 0.825 2.316 0.936
Note: The table presents means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values, and AR(1) coefficient estimates for A-H price ratios.
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TABLE 4 – BUBBLE DETECTION TESTS: A-H SHARES
Company ADF GSADF Company ADF GSADF
Angang -3.304 3.197∗∗∗ Kunming Machin -3.008 2.009
Anhui Conch -3.474 1.004 Maanshan Iron -3.003 3.386∗∗∗
Anhui Express -1.140 7.012∗∗∗ Nanjing Panda -4.339 4.233∗∗∗
Baiyunshan -3.803 1.682 Northeast Elec -2.661 3.432∗∗∗
China East Air -2.727 5.718∗∗∗ S Sh Pechem -2.631 4.142∗∗∗
China Petroleu -2.017 3.835∗∗∗ Sinopec Oilfie -3.024 5.640∗∗∗
Cosco Shipping -2.941 3.033∗∗∗ Southern Air -2.705 4.230∗∗∗
CSSC Marine En -2.850 4.722∗∗∗ Sz Expressway -3.522 4.606∗∗∗
Dongfang Elec -4.002 2.348∗∗ Tianjin Cap -3.818 4.099∗∗∗
Huadian Power -3.000 3.078∗∗∗ Tsingtao Brew -3.063 3.002∗∗∗
Huaneng Power -2.583 4.018∗∗∗ Xinhua Pharm -2.872 4.751∗∗∗
Jiangsu Exp -3.175 2.519∗∗ Yanzhou Coal -3.660 3.802∗∗∗
Jiangxi Copper -2.831 4.530∗∗∗ ZTE -3.467 1.450
Jingcheng Mach -2.993 4.661∗∗∗
AH Premium Index -2.718 3.225∗∗∗ Panel 1.757∗∗∗
Notes: The table reports ADF, GSADF, and panel GSADF test statistics for the AH premium index and the 27 cross-listed companies. ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗
denote statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively. The minimum window size for the GSADF and panel GSADF
test is set equal to 48 weeks. Finite sample critical values are obtained from using 2000 simulations.
TABLE 5 – BUBBLE DETECTION TESTS: AMERICAN DEPOSITORY RECEIPTS
ADR-H A-ADR
Company ADF GSADF ADF GSADF
China East Air -16.376 -0.683 -2.737 5.597∗∗∗
China Petroleu -16.267 -3.114 -2.026 3.964∗∗∗
Huaneng Power -14.811 -0.770 -2.610 3.547∗∗∗
S Sh Pechem -16.075 -2.254 -2.614 3.966∗∗∗
Southern Air -15.488 -0.429 -2.698 4.068∗∗∗
Panel -2.854 2.342∗∗∗
Notes: The table reports GSADF test statistics for the difference between the prices of A shares and ADRs, as well as the difference between the
prices of ADRs and H shares. ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively. The minimum
window size for the GSADF and panel GSADF test is set equal to 48 weeks. Finite sample critical values are obtained from using 2000 simulations.
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TABLE 6 – ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE DYNAMIC PANEL PROBIT MODEL
DPP1 DPP2
Coefficient Estimate Marginal Effect Coefficient Estimate Marginal Effect
lagged exuberance 2.672∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗ 2.670∗∗∗ 0.626∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.024) (0.068) (0.024)
market 3.014∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 3.043∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗











McFadden R2 0.526 0.527
LR Statistic (p-value) 3.680 (0.451)
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates, marginal effects, standard errors, and McFadden R2s for a restricted (DPP1) and an unrestricted
(DPP2) model specification. It also reports the likelihood ratio (LR) statistic and the corresponding p−value for the restriction that the coefficients
on risk, liquidity, spread, and spot are equal to zero. ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively.
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TABLE 7 – ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE DYNAMIC PANEL PROBIT MODEL (FORWARD RATES)
DPP1 DPP2
Coefficient Estimate Marginal Effect Coefficient Estimate Marginal Effect
lagged exuberance 2.583∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗ 2.579∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.033) (0.090) (0.033)
market 3.526∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 3.513∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗











McFadden R2 0.446 0.448
LR Statistic (p-value) 3.218 (0.522)
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates, marginal effects, standard errors, and McFadden R2s for a restricted (DPP1) and an unrestricted
(DPP2) model specification. It also reports the likelihood ratio (LR) statistic and the corresponding p−value for the restriction that the coefficients
on risk, liquidity, spread, and forward are equal to zero. ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels,
respectively.
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FIGURE 1 – HANG SENG AH PREMIUM INDEX
FIGURE 2 – DATE-STAMPING PERIODS OF MARKET EXUBERANCE
AH PREMIUM INDEX PANEL AH
Notes: The plots display the sequence of BSADF statistics (solid line) together with the corresponding 95 percent critical value sequence (dotted
line) for the AH premium index (left) and the panel of 27 cross-listed companies (right). Critical values are obtained using 2000 simulations. The
minimum window is 48 weeks. The shaded areas indicate periods of exuberance.
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FIGURE 3 – DATE-STAMPING PERIODS OF EXUBERANCE IN A-H PRICE DIFFERENTIALS
Notes: The figure shows the periods of exuberance in A-H share price differentials identified by the BSADF date-stamping strategy. 95 percent
critical values are obtained using 2000 simulations. The minimum window size is 48 weeks.
FIGURE 4 – DATE-STAMPING PERIODS OF IN-SAMPLE PREDICTABILITY
Notes: The figure shows the periods of in-sample predictability of A-share price movements identified by IVX rolling-predictive regressions. The
regressor in Equation (13) is the A-H price differential. The window size is 48 weeks.
33
FIGURE 5 – DATE-STAMPING PERIODS OF EXUBERANCE IN A-ADR PRICE DIFFERENTIALS
Notes: The figure shows the periods of exuberance in A-ADR price differentials identified by the BSADF date-stamping strategy. 95 percent critical
values are obtained using 2000 simulations. The minimum window size is 48 weeks.
FIGURE 6 – DATE-STAMPING PERIODS OF IN-SAMPLE PREDICTABILITY
Notes: The figure shows the periods of in-sample predictability of A-share price movements identified by IVX rolling-predictive regressions. The
regressor in Equation (13) is the A-ADR price differential. The window size is 48 weeks.
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